Adapted for the Internet from:

Why God Doesn't Exist

    1.0   So what’s new?

    The seasoned philosophers will say that all I have done is restrict the word object to those things that
    have form.

    Yes! I confirm. That’s what I am proposing.

    But then they’ll say that they’ve known this argument for thousands of years. They already regarded
    shape and form as attributes of objects, together with color and smell and position. These issues have
    been debated ad nauseam. This is nothing new.

    Wrong!

    What is new is to realize that only this property known as shape or form has anything to do with the
    object proper and with Science. The remaining attributes (unity, color, size, etc.) have to do with concepts
    and are circumscribed to ordinary speech. Objects are what you point to and name. This is the only thing
    that the ET sees so far. Anything beyond this treats an object as a category (i.e., a concept, a relation, the
    subject of a sentence, a term, a noun, etc.). Nevertheless, a table is an object before you point and name it.
    It is so because it has shape and not because it has color or size. These other attributes require an
    observer.

    What is new is that we are no longer going to confuse objects with concepts and chase our tails around
    in circles during discussions like Plato, Aristotle, and all of their successors.

    What is new is that now we are aware of why the objecthood debate has gone on for so long. Shape
    synthesizes the notion of Oneness that philosophers have always talked about. When we talk of shape,
    we are not analyzing the thing into its constituent parts. Shape is an attribute taken all by itself.

    What is new is the realization that only this version of the word object can be used consistently in a
    scientific presentation. We certainly cannot use the word object consistently if we say that the object itself
    is made of more objects. This guarantees circularity.

    What is new is that this definition does away with the ‘see/touch’ proof definition used by everyone and
    their mothers. The Moon has shape irrespective of observers. The Moon does not spontaneously blend
    with space when you turn around. The Moon does not have shape only when we are looking at it as the
    morons who believe in the ridiculous Uncertainty Principle hold. The Moon was there before anyone on
    this planet came aboard. The Moon is not yellow as a result that this is the color that reaches the  
    observer’s eyes. And it is not yellow intrinsically because the frequency the Moon’s surface irradiates
    does not define the object Moon. The only attribute that Father Universe recognizes in the Moon is its
    shape. By itself, the Moon is neither big, nor yellow, nor has location. Such attributes require external
    references. Shape requires space, but space is not an object. There is no relation taking place because
    there are no observers. The Moon simply refuses to blend and become one with space irrespective of
    observers. It doesn’t even try. They are by their very nature incompatible. Therefore, unlike color, size,
    location, etc., shape is a de facto attribute. What is new, in other words, is that we have finally rid
    ourselves of the damned observer so necessary to the mathematical and traditional religions of the world.

    What is new is that no one ever realized the importance of the word object to science and to Physics in
    particular. In fact, although they recorded similar definitions of ‘thing’ to the one I am proposing, Aristotle
    and Euclid never used the ‘shape’ notion of object in their arguments. Not a single geometric figure that
    they defined invokes this attribute. Hence, they never understood the significance of shape and
    boundaries. They were almost totally absorbed and fascinated by quantitative relations.  Like the
    mathematicians of today, the Greeks dealt totally with abstractions throughout their dissertations.

    What is new is that relativists and mechanics will now have to produce shapes and not attempt to bluff
    their way with abstract concepts. Either a point has shape (dot) or it doesn’t (location/ordered pair/event)
    And either a black hole has shape and is an object or it doesn't have shape and is a concept. And either
    the space-time sphere is 3-D or 4-D. It is the object-concept duality that mathematicians and philosophers
    thrive on that perpetuates needless discussions. The restriction I now place on the word object will
    differentiate science from religion. Unless there is an explicit or an implicit shape at the Exhibits phase of
    the presentation, the presenter is not doing Science.


    2.0   Other objections

    The philosophers may try to raise a few semantic and epistemological objections. Doesn’t an object also
    have size, length, and extension? Doesn’t an object occupy a position? What about the word ‘that’ in the
    definition. Doesn’t this word already insinuate that we’re talking about an object? Or maybe we should
    just leave the term object undefined or define it as the opposite of nothing?

    Let’s annihilate these ridiculous objections with quantum-like anti-objections so that they don’t haunt us
    further down the road. This will introduce us to more subtle, deeper arguments.


    a. Size

    Qualifiers such as size, length, extent, and position are very tricky. A man measures 1.8 meters. We say
    that this is his size, length, or extent. We determined this by comparing him against another object,
    perhaps a measuring tape. Hence, the inclusion of these properties would make the definition of object
    circular. We would need one object (our pre-defined standard) to determine the size, length, or extent of
    another.

    But let’s bypass Mathematics and measurement altogether and not bring them into the discussion at all.
    The skeptic may argue that an object has shape because it is qualitatively greater than nothing, meaning
    more than emptiness, meaning infinitesimal. This is why we refer to it as something instead of as nothing.
    The question now is whether we have stated anything other than shape. In this context size, length, and
    extent are synonyms of form. What else can these parameters mean outside of mathematical magnitude?
    Surely, we are not comparing the size or length of the object against anything else. We are just saying that
    it is more than nothing in extent, or in the alternative, that space is discontinuous in that region. Matter has
    interrupted the continuity of space so to speak. Whether malleable like a piece of clay or inflatable like a
    latex balloon, an object has size, length, and extent for only a cross-section of time. At that precise
    location, qualitative size, length, extension, and position are synonyms of shape (Fig. 1).

    “ Extension in length, breadth, and thickness constitutes the nature of corporeal
       substance …Everything else that can be ascribed to a body presupposes
       extension.”  [1]  [2]

    How about qualifiers such as continuous or white?

    Again, before we can understand continuous we must compare it against discrete and before we can
    understand white we must understand what a wavelength is. The problem with qualifiers such as
    continuous and white is that they are related to observers and not to what objects are in and of
    themselves. A swan is an object because it has shape and not because it is either white or continuous.
    Shape is a special type of qualifier or property in the sense that it really has no opposite at this level.
    Shape has an opposite in or contrasts with ‘no shape’ whereas object is a category that only includes
    ‘that which has shape.’  
the philosophers
voice their
objections

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    b.   That and Has

    The philosopher may now get picky and say that the word ‘that’ in ‘that which has shape’ converts the
    definition to a tautology.

    The word 'that' serves as a wild card in the definition of object. It functions as anything that we can name
    and that can serve as the subject of a sentence (i.e., a noun, a term). The word object itself, as we will see,
    is a category and therefore a concept. This has nothing to do with the word table which is classified as an
    object. by virtue of its shape. The word ‘that’ momentarily serves as a placeholder for the word under
    scrutiny. The words something, thing, and body are much more ambiguous. Something already
    insinuates a substance.

    The word has may also lead some philosophers to infer that shape is an extrinsic property (e.g., I have a
    penny). Should we accept the foregoing proposal, so the argument would go, shape could just as well be
    a property of the medium that contours our test object. By invoking this medium, the definition is just as
    circular as the ones I criticized. Isn’t a perimeter, after all, an interface between two objects?

    The short answer is no. Here I give this matter a more thorough treatment.


    c.   Nothing

    To say that something is the opposite of nothing is not too much of a problem as long as the proponent
    can define the word nothing in turn without saying that it is the opposite of something. Nevertheless, a
    horse, love, energy, the number 5, and space-time would all equally qualify as ‘not a nothing’ and, surely,
    few will defend the argument that the number 5 is qualitatively identical to the word horse. Like a
    synonym, an antonym is ‘nothing’ but a circular definition.


    d.   Primitive

    Relativists find nothing more useful than leaving key words undefined, particularly those necessary to
    understand their theories. The words that have been left to float around are the ones that form the basis of
    Geometry: point, line, plane, and solid. Since relativity claims to be founded upon Geometry, all of relativity
    sits on quicksand.

    The mathematicians defend themselves by arguing that some words are impossible to define precisely
    and, therefore, must remain ‘primitive.’ The term 'primitive' refers to a word that is ‘useful’ despite that the
    mathematicians are incapable of defining it in simpler terms. This sleight of hand enables prosecutors to
    delegate the task of interpreting a hypothesis to the jury rather than assuming the responsibility of
    formulating and visualizing it themselves first. The tactic consists of apologizing to the jury beforehand
    and declaring that the mathematicians did everything they could to define a word, that they brainstormed
    every possibility, but still came up short:

    “ in pushing our researches further and further, we arrive necessarily at primitive
       words which can no longer be defined”   [3]

     [Necessarily? I wonder why this must be so?]

    Such straight-forward candidness and honesty buys them heart-felt sorrow and a strategic reprieve,
    which they subsequently use to their advantage during trial. They now have a green light to claim that
    space-time is an object, or that a black hole is an object, or that a point particle is an object, and no one
    can challenge them because the crucial word ‘object’ slipped through unchallenged. You know. It is one
    of those whachmacallit... primitive words.

    Actually, when the mathematicians gloss over the definition of ‘useful’ words such as object or exist, the
    theory that follows is not beautiful, as they like to boast in their immense ignorance, but either
    unintelligible or fantastic. A theory founded on strategic primitive words or dualities is simply unscientific.
    We can explain everything and anything with words that we don’t have to define. Is space-time an object?

    “ We must accept that time is not completely separate from and independent of space,
       but is combined with it to form an object called space-time.”  [4]

    Well, as long as we don’t have to define the word object, then yes, maybe it is. Or perhaps space-time is
    just:

    •    a concept:

    “ in the general theory of relativity the space-time-concept refers to the behaviour of
       rigid bodies and clocks.”   [5]

    •        an ‘object-concept’

    “ Let us call the concept or category in question the object-concept, and the thesis of
       its universal applicability the object-thesis. Philosophical uses or senses of ‘object’
       less comprehensive than this are sometimes sponsored—Frege, most notably,
       proposes an absolute if puzzling contrast of object with concept or property—but
       we are here concerned exclusively with the object-concept in its unrestricted sense.” [6]

    •        a ‘mathematical object.’

    “ Space-time, as you might recall, is that almost magical 4-dimensional arena in which
       time and 3-dimensional space are considered as a whole; a single mathematical
       object.”  [7]

    Who knows? In relativity, you can invent your own definitions if you want because no one is allowed to
    challenge the definition. That activity belongs in Philosophy, not in Mathematics. You can say that space-
    time is caca and tell the mathematician that Einstein said so, and he’ll believe you. Laxity is the cause of
    explain-it-all words such as soul, love, and God. If traditional religion teaches us anything, it is that
    ‘usefulness’ is an incorrect criterion, in fact the worst one, for tolerating a word during a presentation.

    The definition of object that I propose closes these loopholes. If we pin the word object down to shape,
    not a single equation can save our mathematicians. I don’t do this to give relativists a hard time. I do it in
    order to use the words consistently and to compel the mathematicians to tell the jury what they really
    mean. I am trying to bring a little bit of logic to the discussion by circumscribing the use of strategic
    words. Don’t relativists claim that the Universe in which we live is a globular ‘thing’? Don’t relativists talk
    about the large-scale structure of the Universe? Don’t they speculate on whether our cosmos is closed,
    open, or hyperbolic? Don’t they also claim that a black hole is an object? Don’t the mechanics claim that
    they accelerate tiny objects called particles? What is the point of all these claims if the mathematicians
    never have to specify what they mean by object?

    Of course, if relativists prefer not to define the word object, they should not be allowed to use this
    heretofore ‘useful’ term in their theories. They should not be allowed to illustrate space-time or a black
    hole until they tell the layman what they mean by object.  As soon as a relativist puts pen to the paper, we
    should stop and ask whether the illustration in progress will depict the actual shape of space-time, black
    hole, or particle. If not, why bother? If this hypothesis is admittedly in disagreement with the theory that
    follows, what is the purpose of the illustration? The surrealistic religion of mathematical physics finds its
    most formidable foe in the definition of the word object!

    Before I can address further objections and counterclaims, it is necessary to establish a clear difference
    between an object and a concept and between real and abstract objects. Only then can we understand
    how to use these words consistently in a scientific setting. Afterwards, I will use these definitions to
    resolve the difficult cases of objecthood (shadow, hole, air, wind, etc.).

Fig. 1
The only property a stand-alone
object has on its own, independent of
observers, is shape. In a
single-object universe, para-meters
such as length, size, volume,
position, etc., are synonymous with
shape because, assuming we now
add an observer, he has nothing
against which to compare these
parameters.
A baby is an
object because I
can cut it in half.
It’s not a
baby. It’s
a boy.
It’s human
because it
has size.
It is not human
because it
doesn’t cry.
If this is a
baby, it is quite
primitive.
A baby is
something
because it is the
opposite of
nothing.
Okay, folks! FOLKS! I’ll side
with the guy at the far end.
Let’s see if we can cut it in
half. Then we'll know for
sure whether it was a thing.