Adapted for the Internet from:

Why God Doesn't Exist

    1.0   A hole, and not the object, is what has form

    Bertamini and Croucher  argue that observers tend to perceive the contour of a hole as belonging to the
    surrounding object, insinuating that a hole has no shape of its own. In their words:

    “ What is therefore the shape of a hole, if any? To resolve this apparent paradox,
       we suggest that the shape of a hole is available indirectly from the shape of the
       surrounding object. We exploited the fact that observers are faster at judging the
       position of convex vertices than concave ones.”  [1]

    “ A hole in a mathematical object is a topological structure which prevents the object
       from being continuously shrunk to a point.”  [2]

    In other words, these philosophers argue that the perceptions of observers have something to do with
    whether a hole is an object. To make their claims scientifically credible, these ‘philosophers’ carry out
    experiments to ‘prove’ objects and publish in journals which name says it all: Perception.

    In a similar vein, Casati and Varzi equate holes with objects because holes have similar properties of
    objects.

    “ [holes] appear to have a determinate shape, a size, and a location.” [3]

    Like Wittgenstein and Russell, they insinuate that a hole is an object because this noun may serve as the
    subject of a sentence. A hole is an object because we can talk about it. Then they ponder the chicken-or-
    the-egg question of whether holes are objects because we can make and count them or because they are
    part of an existing topology:

    “ I would say that the card is doubly perforated because there are two holes in it. You
       say the card with its topology is the truth-maker of our statements concerning the
       holes in it. I say the truth-makers of your statements about the card’s topology are
       the hole.” [4]

    All of these philosophers would save themselves circular discussions if they merely defined what they
    mean by the word object. Punching a hole or verifying its shape in a controlled experiment is not the way
    to ascertain that a hole is an object. This is the ‘proof’ method of defining proposed by Ramsey and Lewis
    and is unscientific. It is unscientific because a 'proof definition' cannot be used consistently in a
    discussion.

    In the last 2000 years, the philosophers of the world have not figured out that we don’t define objects by
    making them. The numskulls of Philosophy are comparing how they make holes (punching the card)
    against a still image of a hole.

    But is a hole an object merely because it has shape? I believe that we now have established the
    foundations to answer such concerns without involving either a hands-on or a thought experiment.
    Whether a shadow or a hole or space-time is an object has nothing to do with observers or opinions. The
    word object represents a category. If a hole meets the criteria – shape – all on its own it qualifies as an
    object by definition. Otherwise, it doesn’t. If the issue of whether a hole is an object involved the opinions
    of observers, half the world would believe that a hole is an object and the other half that it isn’t.

    I suggest rather that, like a shadow, a hole fails to meet the minimum 'shape' requirement of the definition
    of object because it does not stand alone without the object that gives it shape. The alleged shape of the
    'object' hole is really the inner shape of the enclosure that prevents space from serving as a backdrop to
    the hole directly. The concept ring may not do without the hole and the hole involves at least an
    explanation of depth, but the object ring stands alone without references to other objects. The ET does
    not need to understand what a hole is to visualize a ring and associate the word ring with the designated
    object. Should we accept the hole as an object, both definitions would become circular. The object ring
    would require that we first define the object hole and the object hole would require that we first define the
    object ring before we can classify either as an object. If a devil’s advocate proposes that a hole is an
    object nested within another object, from a strictly conceptual point of view, its perimeter or surface has
    an infinitesimal yet finite separation from the ring and we should be able to isolate the hole, pull it out, and
    exhibit it independently. These arguments can be extended to any dispute involving objects and
    concepts.

    In order for there to be two objects, each must be conceived as having its own surface.  Despite all
    appearances, (and again, strictly from a conceptual point of view) there must absolutely be an
    infinitesimal gap at the interface if the skeptic insists that there are two objects. Otherwise there would be
    a single object with no dividing surface or line. Only if each surface is delineated by space can we
    conceive of one object being inside the other. The seeming ‘common perimeter’ is an optical illusion, a
    question of observers and experiments and not of what really IS. We may not know whether a hole is
    contoured by space just before touching the ring, but certainly the hole and the ring 'know'.

    A hole is not an object, but an opening within an object. The word hole implies that a fragment or piece
    was removed. The piece that was removed can be called an object, but not the hole it left behind. But what
    is more revealing about the methods the idiots of contemporary Philosophy use is that after beating the
    horse to death, they still cannot tell you unambiguously whether a hole is an object. They don't propose a
    definition of either 'object' or 'hole'. They propose a theory.  

    " we still need an explicit theory of holes" [5]

    What bumbling fools! What idiots! And these are the experts? These are the people who make the big
    bucks working at universities and publishing in journals of Philosophy?

    After a while a rational human being loses all hope and can only be amused by the experts of Philosophy
    and Mathematical Physics. These folks have no more grey matter than what is necessary to clean latrines.

    No! We don't need a 'theory' of holes. In Science, we do not explain holes. In Science, we define them.
    What we need is an explicit and unambiguous definition of the word hole! Afterwards, you can theorize
    anything you want!
Is a hole and
object?

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    Last modified 01/12/08


        Copyright © by Nila Gaede 2008

    Heidmann may disagree. After all, if we remove half a book, we have half the hole and half the mass. Isn’t
    this a way of dividing it?

    If we slide ten adjacent, 1-inch thick books to the left, the one inch thick hole that we create does not
    correspond to the volume of the ten books. The effort necessary to slide the ten books does not equate to
    the effort necessary to create this proportionally tiny hole. Therefore, the mass of one hole is not
    equivalent to the mass necessary to create the hole. If the bookshelf is on wheels, we expend less effort
    rolling than sliding. Again, the mass of the books is unrelated to the alleged mass of the hole. If we now
    slide the books 10 meters from the wall, the volume of the hole we create will also be larger than the
    volume occupied by the ten books. Hence, any way we look at it, Heidmann’s conclusion is wrong.

    What his example confirms, instead, is that it is misleading to define the word object through a listing of
    attributes or through measurement or experiment. As always, the analogies of relativity are misconceived
    and, as always, the mathematicians will defend themselves by trivializing the analogy they proposed as
    evidence of their arguments. So, again, why did they invoke the analogy in the first place? If Mathematics
    is the only route to relativity, they should not even attempt qualitative physical interpretations.

Fig. 2   A hole is not a book

(except in the religion of Math Phyz)

If a bookshelf full of books is located
in space and we remove two books,
what is the shape of the hole?
I'm sorry, Bill! Did
you say you wanted
another nail?
No, Steve! Please
pass me a hole! The
pain is killing me!

    2.0   The book is mightier than the hole

    Heidmann  presents a different argument. He likens a hole to the region a book leaves behind when it is
    removed from or slides along a shelf.

    " Imagine a row of books on a library shelf. If you remove a book, you can consider that
       you have created two 'objects': the free book (in your hand) and the hole in the row...
       But, is the hole on the shelf really an object, just like the book that has been removed?
       It certainly has some properties in common. For example, just like a real book, the hole
       can be moved along the shelf, by the simple action of sliding neighboring books one
       by one along  the shelf. An the work needed to move a hole is the same as that needed
       to move a real book. So the hole behaves as if it had the mass of an actual book." (p. 101) [6]


    Heidmann then extrapolates the book-hole analogy to electrical charge. When we apply a voltage, an
    electron (the book) moves in one direction and the hole in the other. This is how the idiots of Mathematics
    explain today how a semiconductor works. [7] They also rely on this mechanism to explain how
    annihilation works. [8] Of course, all these theories are contingent on the assumption that the Universe is
    entirely comprised of discrete particles, space included. If this assumption is incorrect, the explanations
    the mechanics have been offering for the last 80 years end up in the dump.

    But let’s 'test' Heidmann’s claim to see if it has any validity. Let's now remove two contiguous books from
    the shelf. We have two books and we can take them in two separate ways, Not so with the single hole we
    left behind (Fig. 2)! This experiment clearly shows that a hole is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively like
    a book. We can also slice a book in half, but not the hole it left behind.

    Fig. 1   The day a hole lost its doughnut